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Shared Management of Reasonable Risk:
Implications for Environmental
Assessment and Monitoring
VERN

R. WALKER*

Far too often, the workings of environmental law appear to be
unfair to different affected parties, inefficient in its processes, ineffective in its outcomes and unpredictable in its course. Such general
complaints take on concrete urgency for those facing management
decisions about committing resources to environmental assessment
and monitoring. Program management and planning presuppose an
adequate conception of the nature of the task to be accomplished.
To a certain extent, however, these complaints about environmental law, and even the underlying deficiencies they validly reflect, derive from a failure to understand what environmental law is
and what it is about. A fruitful understanding of environmental law
would show why certain dynamics occur and where they can be
expected to lead. This Article suggests that environmental law, and
the legal liability it creates, is a symptom of a social movement to
institute a shared management approach to deciding which risks are
reasonable and worth taking. Environmental law provides one
method to achieve stable, long-term management solutions for risktaking in society. The Article also suggests that this conception of
environmental law can in fact improve the ability to predict trends
relevant to assessment and monitoring.
This Article contains two major parts. Part I presents a general
model to assist in understanding the developments in environmental
law. The difficulty with environmental law is that there are many
complicated and overlapping treaties, statutes and regulations making it difficult to see the forest rather than the trees. This model for

. Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, New York,
USA. Ph.D. 1975, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1980, Yale University. Many of the
ideas in this Article were first presented at the 1995 Royal Dutch/Shell Group Environmental Seminar on "Assessment and Monitoring," Scheveningen/The Hague, The Netherlands (15 - 18 May 1995).
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understanding environmental liability involves two basic concepts:
"shared management" and "reasonable risk." Part II of this Article
utilizes the model, together with examples from recent laws and
cases in the United States, to explore implications for environmental
assessment and monitoring.
I. GENERAL MODEL
Environmental law can be understood as part of society's collective effort to manage the risk to which its members are exposed.
The law creates shared management structures designed to make
decisions about the reasonableness of those risks. This general
model breaks naturally into two parts. One part focuses on the
shared management structures while the other part focuses on the
risk decisions addressed by those structures.
A. Shared Management
It is important first to understand the concept of "shared
management." The reference to "management" involves all of the
decision making processes necessary to run an enterprise.
Management activities oversee exploring and drilling, siting of
facilities, transporting and refining, manufacturing, packaging and
labeling, shipping product and disposing of waste, as well as responding to complaints and crises and maintaining product stewardship.
In other words, management consists of all of the diverse decision
making processes involved in running a business.
Shared management is a program of transferring portions of the
management process to governmental institutions outside of a company. A hundred years or so ago, that long list of management
functions necessary to run a business would have been handled
entirely within a private company. Throughout the world, virtually
all of those decisions were being made without the involvement of
government. The growth of environmental law has caused the
increased sharing of such management decision making with
government. This sharing has occurred, and continues to occur, at
different rates and in different ways in the various jurisdictions
around the world.
What results from this process are shared management structures involving multiple decision makers, often unbelievably complex and inefficient. Governmental permits help decide the conditions of exploration and production and the sites of facilities.
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Governmental regulations help determine the routes and means of
transport. Administrative rules govern product packaging, labeling
and use. In addition to such prospective regulation, retrospective
compensation laws place performance requirements on all other
management decisions. If a management decision in fact injures a
person or property, then the judicial institutions of government are
likely to evaluate the prudence of that decision and the care with
which it was carried out. As a result of these developments, the
flow diagram for almost any significant management decision is
now extremely complex and involves governmental decision makers.
Shared management structures are now even more complicated
than described above. Today government consists of layers of
institutions at the local, state, federal, regional and global levels. In
the United States, for example, local ordinances and state laws
dealing with hazardous chemicals may or may not be preempted by
federal laws. Even when federal regulations do preempt state
regulations, they often do not preempt state compensation laws for
accidents or product related injuries. And it is unclear what role the
regional free trade agreements and the World Trade Organization
will play in management decisions at the operating level. History,
however, displays a relentless logic that leads from the lowering of
trade duties on products at the border to attempts to equalize the
conditions of production within a common market. Witness, for
example, the 200-year history of the United States or the 50-year
history leading up to the European Union.
The first point of this Article is to urge that environmental law
not be viewed as a set of edicts imposed by an adversarial external
government. Instead, it is useful to think of the law as the evolution
of a complex structure of shared management. Environmental law
establishes the minimal management process that society expects for
decision making. The new reality is that numerous stakeholder
interests play an active role in the management of the business,
through the institutions of government.
B. Reasonable Risk
The second concept in the general model is that of "reasonable
risk." This is what shared management structures are trying to
decide in the environmental area. "Risk" is now a quasi-scientific
question about hazards and the likelihood of harm. But "reasonable"
risk is a management concept: it is the risk that is acceptable under
the circumstances or the risk that is worth taking. Environmental
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law represents society's attempt to agree on what risks are
reasonable. Environmental liability merely states the negative side of
this problem: we are trying to avoid unreasonable risk, and we will
hold liable those who create unreasonable risks.
It is not difficult to find examples of shared management decisions concerning reasonable risks. First, legislatures sometimes
decide what risks are reasonable for entire categories of activities or
products. In the United States, for example, Congress has determined that no risk is reasonable from a food additive that is an
animal carcinogen.' Another example is provided by hazardous air
pollutants, for which Congress has determined, in effect, that a
reasonable risk of cancer is 1 excess case per 1,000,000 people exposed.2 In such cases, it is the legislative institution of government
that decides which risks are worth taking.
Second, an administrative agency may be given the task of
deciding which risks are reasonable. In the United States, examples
of these agency decisions involve pesticides3 and chemical substances.4 A debate arose after the sweeping Republican Congressional
victories in November 1994 concerning whether all environmental
laws should be changed to require agencies to determine what risks

See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended, 21 U.S.C. §
348(c)(3)(A) (1994). "[No (food] additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to
induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are
appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or
animal .
."
2 See Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993). "If
[emission] standards promulgated pursuant to subsection (d) of this section and applicable
to a category or subcategory of sources emitting a pollutant (or pollutants) classified as a
known, probable or possible human carcinogen do not reduce lifetime excess cancer risks
to the individual most exposed to emissions from a source in the category or subcategory to less than one in one million, the Administrator shall promulgate standards
under this subsection for such source category."
' Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)
(1994): "The Administrator shall register a pesticide if,: . . [among other conditions]
(D) . . . it will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment."
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1994) provides that:
If the Administrator finds that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that
the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of a
chemical substance or mixture, or that any combination of such activities,
presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment, the Administrator shall by rule apply one or more of the
following requirements to such substance or mixture to the extent necessary
to protect adequately against such risk using the least burdensome requirements . . ..
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are reasonable through a formal cost-benefit analysis.'
Third, courts oversee findings of reasonable risk when they
make decisions concerning compensation for past injuries. These
decisions are based largely on an evaluation of the past performance
of the defendant. In many cases, courts (acting with or without
juries) order the defendant to pay compensation only if the defendant acted negligently in the particular circumstances -- in other
words, only if the defendant created an unreasonable risk. Sometimes, however, courts hold certain activities involving hazardous
substances to be "abnormally dangerous" and order compensation
whenever such an activity in fact causes injury.6 Under a theory of
nuisance, a court might determine that the risk or harm created by
the activity is reasonable only if the actor compensates for harm
caused.7 Therefore, when the courts enforce strict liability, which
does not require proof of negligence, the judgment is still based on
a determination of what risk is reasonable. In these instances, the
risk evaluation is made by the judge, rather than a jury, and often
about categories of activities, not merely the particular case at bar.
Of course, the decision process can become extremely complicated and inefficient when it involves the interaction of institutions
of government. Examples are easily found in the areas of health,
safety and environment, in which the legislature often enacts a
statute that must be interpreted and implemented by an agency.
These actions can also be judicially reviewed by the courts at various stages: the act of the legislature for constitutionality, the interpretation of the agency for permissibility, and the factfinding and
decisions of the agency for adequacy and appropriateness.
Regardless of which institution of government oversees the
decision making process and regardless of whether the decision is a
detailed engineering regulation or an award of compensation based
on a performance standard, the core decision focuses on how the
business should be managed in the face of risk. The problem addressed by environmental law is how to make good decisions con-

' See 141 CONG. REC. H2607 (March 3, 1995).
6 E.g., T & E Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249 (NJ. 1991)
(holding that processing, handling and disposal of radium constituted abnormally dangerous activity). Cf. Analytical Measurements, Inc. v. Keuffel & Esser Co., 843 F. Supp.
920 (N.J. 1993) (holding that determination of "abnormally dangerous activity" is factual
issue); Kowalski v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 841 F. Supp. 104, 108-09 (W.D. N.Y.
1994) (holding that the court's determination of "abnormally dangerous activity" requires
substantial evidence).
' See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822, 826, 829A (1979).
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ceming the reasonableness of risk and how to get agreement on
those decisions.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING

This Article proposes that environmental law be viewed as
creating a complex structure of shared management, designed in part
to determine the reasonableness of the risks faced by members of
society. Why is such a general conceptual model useful? Some
general answers can be suggested in the area of environmental assessment and monitoring as well as some specific examples.
A. General Implications
The first general implication concerns the information needed
for making good management decisions about risk. It is nearly impossible to determine what risks are faced, and whether undertaking
them is reasonable, without the benefit of environmental assessment
and monitoring. The risks usually cannot be determined without
hazard identification, dose-response assessment, exposure assessment, and risk characterization 8 The feasibility, costs and
benefits of management alternatives cannot be estimated without
assessment, and cannot be confirmed without monitoring. Decision
makers throughout the complex management structure need such
information in order to make decisions about reasonable risk.
Second, we need to take very seriously the management aspects
of this model. If assessment and monitoring are needed to provide
information for making management decisions, then the results of
that assessment and monitoring have to be useful from the
standpoint of making such risk decisions. When the emphasis is on
the basis for environmental liability, the focus is on what the public
side of the shared management structure considers to be absolutely
essential to decision making. However, the shared management
model goes beyond liability. It encourages a more robust view of
the relationship between the scientist and the public decision maker.

' See, e.g.,
GOVERNMENT:

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,

MANAGING

COMMUNITIES, COMMISSION DIRECTIVE

RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL

(1983); THE COMMISSION
93/67/EEC OF 20 JULY 1993,

THE PROCESS

OF THE EUROPEAN
LAYING

DOWN THE

PRINCIPLES FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO MAN AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF SUBSTANCES
WITH COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 67/548/EEC, No. L 227, OFFICIAL
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUTNmES 8.9.93 (1993).
NOTIFIED IN ACCORDANCE
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Those performing assessment and monitoring should be concerned
about the ultimate purposes for which their information is needed,
and should strive to play a useful role in that shared management
process.
Third, the information needed must be cross-disciplinary and
integrated, because the ultimate decision is about the reasonableness
of risk. The information must be cross-disciplinary because we need
to know not only about hazards and potential exposure, but also
about technologically feasible alternatives, and the economic costs
and benefits of each alternative. This information derives from very
diverse sciences and therefore must be integrated because the management task is to make comparisons, weigh alternatives, and balance risks against benefits. That is impossible to do unless the information providers are all using comparable metrics, and all working
from commonly understood models and assumptions.
The fourth general point involves risk communication. The
information generated through assessment and monitoring is
worthless unless it can be communicated effectively to management.
To all of management. Management now includes the various
institutions of government and the public. There are many audiences
to reach; not just scientific colleagues, or the internal corporate
management structure, but also governmental officials and general
citizens. Each audience operates under distinct process constraints,
has somewhat different decisions to make and has vastly different
capacities to understand scientific information. The shared
management model stresses the integrated nature of the entire
decision process, and leads to the conclusion that useful information
must be communicated to all decision makers within the shared
management structure.
In short, what does society expect of environmental assessment
and monitoring, as expressed in its environmental laws? Society
expects the parties responsible for assessment and monitoring to
generate the information about reasonable risk needed by the relevant shared management structures and to communicate that information in an effective and timely manner to all those with a need to
know. If a company cannot manage to do that adequately, and does
not actually implement the shared management decisions that are
made, it will be held accountable. That, in essence, is environmental
law.
Now that the general model is in place and some general implications have been explored, it is time to see whether the model
can provide some specific ideas for environmental assessment and
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monitoring.
B. Specific Implications
In giving specific examples, this survey will proceed from the
traditional and familiar to the more novel. Environmental law originated in and remains centered on the management of current operations at existing facilities, with particular attention to the waste
streams leaving those facilities. This historical origin is in keeping
with the need to justify societal intrusion into the management of
private property. But shared management has moved beyond waste
streams to other facets of internal operations, beyond present operations to future and past operations, and beyond facility-based operations to product regulation. In each direction, the clear trend has
been toward increasing the amount of shared management involved
in decisions over risk. The general model leads to specific suggestions for those conducting assessment and monitoring.
1. Waste Streams from Current Operations at Facilities
The most familiar context for environmental assessment and
monitoring is with regard to waste streams from current operations
at facilities. The adequacy of such monitoring is sometimes evaluated from the important but narrow perspective of maintaining compliance with a discharge permit. The general model, however, suggests that the perspective be broadened to keep in mind the shared
management context. The relevant questions are, "What is the
monitoring for and what management decision does it serve?" To
the extent that the monitoring is desirable due to some risk well
beyond the end of the pipe, the monitoring data are useful if they
are helpful in making decisions about the reasonableness of that
risk. The assessor should be able to explain to management why she
is, or is not, monitoring for a specific substance, or why she is
monitoring at a certain level of precision (today nanograms, or even
picograms). Generating information has real costs. It is inefficient to
generate data without determining why the monitoring data are
needed.
In addition, environmental law is increasingly more attentive to
assessing discharge impacts to ecological endpoints beyond the
immediately receiving medium. These ecological impacts may be
important for their own sakes, and also as part of a human risk
assessment. Two developments are worth noting.
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One important development involves deciding the economic
value of lost natural resources and environmental injuries. Costbenefit management decisions should be based upon information
about the incremental effects and costs expected from alternative
management options. Moreover, compensation laws require determinations of the damages due for actual injury.9 Society needs the
help of environmental assessment in defining those costs.
Second, there is increasing emphasis in the United States on
so-called "indirect risk assessment," which is part of human exposure assessment. Indirect exposures from an air emission, for example, might occur through deposition onto soil, which then gets
washed into surface waters, where it is taken up by fish, which are
ingested by humans, who thus receive a dose indirectly through the
food chain. 0 The U.S. EPA is currently using indirect assessments
in the permit process for hazardous waste incinerators," and is
See, e.g., Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2) (1994) which states:
The damages [under the section on liability] are the following:
(A) Natural resources
Damages for injury to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of,
natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing the damage,
which shall be recoverable by a United States trustee, a State trustee, an
Indian tribe trustee, or a foreign trustee.
(C) Subsistence use
Damages for loss of subsistence use of natural resources, which shall
be recoverable by any claimant who so uses natural resources which have
been injured, destroyed, or lost, without regard to the ownership or management of the resources.
See also National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Proposed Rule on Natural
Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 1062 (1994). "Natural resource damage
assessments . . . are not intended to replace response actions, which have as their
primary purpose the protection of human health, but to supplement them, by providing a
process for determining proper compensation to the public for injury to natural resources." Id. at 1062.
'o E.g., Gary L. Liberson, et al., A Regulatory Conundrun: indirect Risk Assessmen! and Dioxin, Expert Opinion Supplement, COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES REVIEW, Jan. 31,
1994, at 1-4.
Relying on air dispersion modeling and various vapor uptake models, a
typical indirect risk assessment will estimate the concentration of selected
chemicals (mainly dioxins and furans) in locally grown fruits, vegetables,
grasses and grains. The process will continue with an estimation of the
intake of these chemicals by beef and dairy cattle and other livestock
through ingestion of grasses and grains. Finally, the process will provide
an estimate of the contribution of these food sources to the total risk to
individuals. The process further expands potential routes of exposure by
considering how the chemicals of interest reach the soil, surface waters,
sediment, and finally, fish, which subsequently are ingested by individuals.
E.g., Hazardous Waste: Research Council to Form Committee to Study Link
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considering using them to evaluate pollutants under the Clean Air
Act. 2 This is a reflection of society's interest in total dose received
through all media of exposure.
The shared management model suggests stepping back from the
conception of waste streams as a permit problem, and viewing the
context surrounding waste as posing a societal management problem. The question is how society can best manage the total risk
associated with production, which includes the generation of waste.
Although the viable management possibilities are generally limited,
they often include management options beyond the conventional
waste streams using the media of air or water, and the disposal of
solid waste.
We should not be surprised, then, when societies expand liability in order to implement innovative management options. For
example, we are now encountering unconventional waste streams. In
a recent case in New York, the wife of a worker brought suit
claiming that her bladder cancer was caused by a chemical to which
she had become exposed through her husband's clothing and hair,
when he came home from work at night. 3 In addition, unconventional damages are being awarded. In the United States, defendants
may be ordered to pay for medical monitoring programs for plaintiffs. 4 These damages are to provide medical care to watch for
adverse health conditions that have not yet developed. This remedy
is not so surprising, however, when we view the problem faced by
the court as one of how to manage increased risk.
Another trend is expanding liability back up the chain leading
to the waste. Several oil companies were recently held liable for
cleanup costs as generators of hazardous waste for which they ar-

Between Health Risks, Waste Combustion, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1266 (Oct. 28, 1994);
Hazardous Waste: Indirect Risk Assessment Protocol Inadequate, Should Be Used As
Analytical Tool Only, SAB Says, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 499 (July 15, 1994). Cf. Addendum to the Methodology for Assessing Health Risks Associated with Indirect Exposure
to Combustor Emissions, 58 Fed. Reg. 61,688 (1993).
" E.g., Hazardous Waste: Research Council to Form Committee to Study Link
Between Health Risks, Waste Combustion, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1266 (Oct. 28, 1994).
" Kowalski v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 841 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. N.Y. 1994)
(denying defendant's motion that summary judgment be granted for lack of duty of care,
and also defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's strict liability cause of action in which
the plaintiff alleged injury from release of an abnormally dangerous substance).
" E.g., Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 655 (Cal. App. 1993), review
dismissed, 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 623 (Cal. 1993); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d
287 (NJ. 1987). See In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 849-52
(3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, General Electric Co. v. Knight, 499 U.S. 961 (1991) (discussing the increasingly recognized "cause of action for medical monitoring").
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ranged disposal at a site away from their refining facilities, even
though that waste and its disposal were due to governmental de5
mands to produce aviation fuel in World War II. What is driving
this expansion of liability is the stubborn and real societal problem
of how best to manage the waste that actually exists. Expanding the
scope of liability can be understood as an assertion of societal authority to establish a shared management structure over some aspect
of the defendant's decision making.
The general model, therefore, puts discharge permits in a
broader societal context, and leads to an expectation of expansion
by the decision makers of the management options open to them for
dealing with the substantial problem of waste. The model also counsels those conducting monitoring, that the data they gather may be
used by an expanded structure of shared managers who have different management agendas and varying abilities to appreciate the
relevance of that data. One important legal development has been
the giving of management oversight to private citizens through
citizen suit provisions in statutes. For example, in March of 1995
environmental groups filed suit against several oil companies for
alleged water pollution violations in Alaska's Cook Inlet.16 EPA
had filed administrative complaints a week before, but the environmental plaintiffs were apparently unhappy with the extent of EPA's
enforcement effort. The trend has been to authorize private citizens
to enforce permit conditions in the courts. One result is that environmental assessors will need to communicate with7 more parties
who have roles in the shared management structure.

1993). Cf 42
'5 United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. 962 (C.D. Cal.
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988) (dealing with liability of those who arrange for disposal or
treatment).
16
Yereth Rosen, Oil Companies Sued for Alaska Cook Inlet Pollution, REUTERS
FINANCIAL REPORT, March I, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, TXTNEWS File.
17
See, e.g., Research Council to Form Committee to Study Link Between Health
Risks, Waste Combustion, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1266 (Oct. 28, 1994) (final rule is
expected on increasing public involvement in the permitting process for facilities to
transfer, store and dispose of hazardous waste).
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2. Future and Past Operations at Facilities
Competent management conducts careful planning before embarking on new projects, such as constructing new facilities. The
environmental impact statements required by statutes under certain
circumstances attempt to ensure that adequate planning is performed."8 Environmental assessment for new facilities should address not only impacts on the natural environment, but also social
and economic effects. In the United States, environmental impact
statements have for decades addressed at least those socio-economic
consequences that are caused directly by impacts on the physical
environment, and failure to address such effects could well lead to a
court injunction on any governmental actions for which an impact
statement was required. 9 Consideration of such effects is essential
to a reasonable management decision, and expanded concern for
social effects of new projects should be expected. Such concerns
also underscore the need for doing environmental assessments in a
cross-disciplinary and integrated context.
Environmental law has also affected the planning needed before
undertaking a new project that involves purchasing assets from
another party. Some of the most difficult developments in the United States concern the due diligence required by a purchaser to discover past acts of pollution before acquiring land, facilities, or an
ongoing business that owns or operates land. There has been a great
deal of litigation about the degree of pre-purchase assessment that is
needed to keep from buying the liability for the cleanup of past
releases that the purchaser did not cause.2"
E.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1994).
See, e.g., CEQ regulations concerning the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.16, 1508.8, 1508.14 (1994). Examples of court injunctions
are Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'ns v. U.S. Postal Service, 516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975)
and Mullin v. Skinner, 756 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. N.C. 1990).
Establishing the necessity to draw the line at some point is Metropolitan Edison
Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE), 460 U.S. 766 (1983), in which the U.S.
Supreme Court held that NEPA did not require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
take into account the psychological stress caused by fear of another accident, before
restarting a nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island.
0
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). The parties who are presumptively liable for
response costs for hazardous substances include present owners and operators of a
facility, as well as past owners or operators at the time of disposal. Several narrow
defenses are established by 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b), including certain circumstances in
which the "release or threat of release" of the hazardous substance was "caused solely
by . . . (3) an act or omission of a third party other than . . . one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship . . . with the defendant ..
"
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) added sec'9
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There are several trends in the area of cleanup liability for past
operations - trends that manifest the managerial nature of the
problems being faced. First, government is clearly extending its
management role in this area. Now under U.S. law, cleanup costs
may be recoverable for "releases" of hazardous substances that
never leave the private facility.2 Prior to these developments, common law liability was generally triggered only if the owner or
operator injured persons or the property of others, or deprived others
of the use and enjoyment of their own property. Government is now
involved in the management decision regarding cleanup whenever a
release occurs.
A serious problem familiar to all managers is where to obtain
the funds to pay for a decision to clean up a pollution release.
Shared management structures have similar financial problems, with
possible solutions ranging from expending general funds (whether
covered by current taxes or borrowed against future revenues) to
raising money by increasing product prices. It is no surprise that the
trend is to extend ever wider the circle of those potentially liable to
help fund the cleanup costs.22 For political and perhaps economic
reasons, the cleanup costs are assessed increasingly to the project,
and to whoever eventually owns, manages or derives a benefit from
the project.
Society increasingly expects management oversight to continue

tion 9601(35)(A), a definition of "contractual relationship" as including "instruments
transferring title or possession, unless the real property . . . was acquired by the defendant after the disposal" and, for example, "[a]t the time the defendant acquired the
facility the defendant did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous
substance which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on,
in, or at the facility." Under subsection (B), "[t]o establish that the defendant had no
reason to know, . . . the defendant must have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all
appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with
good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability."
For cases litigating these obviously fact-specific and time-specific issues, see WILUAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENrAL LAW 799 (2d ed. 1994).
2 United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 623 (D. N.H. 1988), affd, 26 F.3d
261 (1st Cir. 1994) (releases of hazardous chemicals); United States v. Iron Mountain
Mines, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1528, 1536-37 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (dealing with acid mine
drainage).
22 For a general overview, see RODGERS, supra note 20, at 748-99. See, e.g.,
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. 962 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (finding against
defendants on act of war defense); Analytical Measurements, Inc. v. Keuffel & Esser
Co., 843 F. Supp. 920, 925-27 (D. NJ. 1993) (under New Jersey law, a factual issue
existed whether a parent of a subsidiary could be liable for the polluting activities of the
latter, although those activities had ceased about 20 years before the purchase of that
company's assets by the parent).
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beyond the commercial life of a project.23 Of course, the difficult
question of reasonable risk is, "How clean is clean enough?" The
management decision rule in the United States under Superfund has
been undefined and indeterminate. This has resulted in the negotiation of remedies on a site-by-site basis.24 A bill passed in 1995
by the U.S. House of Representatives would apparently subject
many cleanup orders to risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis.'
Whatever management criterion is applied in this context to determine whether risk is reasonable, it is clear that environmental assessment and monitoring must remain at the heart of the decision
making process.
As this Article will suggest later, what is clean enough in a
society today might not be clean enough tomorrow. This increase in
the risk aversion of societal decision makers should be expected,
particularly if the wealth of the society and its population density
both increase. To those called upon to help manage the waste or pay
for the cleanup, a heightened standard of acceptability might seem
to be an injustice, the unfairness associated with applying later legal
standards to earlier actions. Using the general model proposed here,
however, the problem is seen as one of management and the
dynamic of increased expectations is to be expected. At least as a
model for understanding what transpires, as opposed to a normative
model for justifying it, viewing legal action as management is likely
to be more productive than debating blame or fault.
3. Environmental Assessment of Products
Today many societies expect adequate management of everything leaving the company's operating site, whether it has economic
value in the marketplace or not. The law of liability for injuries
caused by the company's products after shipment actually predates
liability for waste streams. Courts may hold manufacturers liable for
injuries caused by defectively designed products or containers,
defective product information and warnings, and manufacturing
defects (such as "off-spec product").26 Two recent examples point

".' See, e.g., U.S., Colorado reach "unprecedented" cleanup pact at Rocky Mountain
Arsenal, BNA Chemical Regulation Daily (June 15, 1995) (reporting agreement reached
"without litigation" to clean up the nation's largest Superfund site).
14
RODGERS, supra note 20, at 731. For a general overview, see RODGERS at 72445.
,
26

See supra note 5.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (strict liability of product
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to the direction of change. In a case that went to trial in March of
1995, the city of Fresno, California, sued three manufacturers of the
pesticide DBCP.27 The city alleged that DBCP used by farmers in
the area was contaminating city wells, and that the danger had been
known to the manufacturers when the product was sold. In another
California DBCP case, the court ordered compensation for the costs
of medical monitoring." The plaintiffs alleged that the DBCP was
used by farmers in the manner intended, had migrated into
groundwater, and had been ingested by plaintiffs at a public school.
Clearly, society increasingly expects the management of products to
extend well beyond their sale and even beyond their intended use.
Once the problems with harmful products are viewed side-byside with the problems with waste from facilities and understood
from the perspective of shared management, then it is reasonable to
expect legal liability for products to follow a pattern similar to that
for waste. The search for management options may expand in the
former case, just as it has in the latter. And along with increased
public management goes the need for more environmental assessment and monitoring.
For example, Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) is a "cradle-tograve" management approach for products. LCA assesses not only
the environmental impact of product production and distribution, but
also the impact of extracting and using natural resources and the
impact of ultimate disposal or recycling after use. LCA is important
to the full-cost pricing long favored by many economists and legal
liability theorists.29 Full-cost pricing means that the price of the
finished product should cover the total costs associated with the
product, including all the health risks and environmental costs discovered through LCA. Products are underpriced and thus tend to be
overconsumed when their prices do not reflect the total cradle-tograve costs. LCA and full-cost pricing may also become important
elements in achieving the international goal of sustainable development, as it is articulated, for example, in Agenda 21 and the followup U.N. programs after the Conference on Environment and

seller); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § I (Tentative Draft No. 2; March 13, 1995).
" Greg Ahlstrand, Fresno Suit Over DBCP Under Way, THE FRESNO BEE, March
2, 1995, at BI; Mark Arax, Banned DBCP Still Haunts San Joaquin Valley Water, L.A.
TIMES, June 12, 1995, at Al.
' Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 655 (Cal. App. 1993), review dismissed, 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 623 (Cal. 1993).
19
Cf. Gumo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (especially Chapter 5,
discussing market deterrence).
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Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.30 LCA can also be expected to play a role in implementing treaties that invoke the precautionary principle of international law. 3
The shared management approach to reasonable risk thus
provides a natural context in which LCA functions as a management
tool. The model might also add an important perspective to the
contents of LCA. LCA can begin to flounder at the inventory phase
- the phase where the assessor identifies all of the environmental
costs. This phase can be plagued by the boundary problem: where
should we draw the line with regard to which costs to count?32
Once we begin to track causal chains in the environment, we find
that most effects are connected to other effects, and an LCA for a
simple product, such as paper or polystyrene cups, might turn out to
be a study of nearly everything. Perhaps it would help to ask, "What
is the LCA information for?" To the extent that the answer is "to
make good shared management decisions about reasonable risk,"
then the concept of reasonable risk may help to set boundaries on
the extent of the inventory that is actually needed.
Ecolabeling is one area where some societies might use LCA to
establish public management criteria for awarding ecolabels.33 But
the general model of shared management suggests that something
more fundamental is going on with ecolabeling. In effect, the
ecolabeling movement is trying to expand the decision making role
of the individual consumer within the shared management structure.
Of course, the individual consumer is the decision maker with
regard to whether to buy an individual unit of product. The pertinent
question is, "What information does that decision maker need to
make his or her decision?" The minimum that every consumer needs

" E.g., Nicholas A. Robinson, "Colloquium: The Rio Environmental Law Treaties"
IUCN's Proposed Covenant on Environment & Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
133 (1995). Cf. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: Council
Recommendation on the Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to Accidental Pollu-

tion, 28 I.L.M. 1320, 1322 (1989). "The Polluter-Pays Principle ...
means that the
polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out the pollution prevention and control
measures ....
In other words, the cost of these measures should be reflected in the cost
of goods and services which cause pollution in production and/or consumption," quoting
from the Recommendation of the Council of 14 November 1974.
" For a survey and analysis of formulations of the precautionary principle in
treaties, see James E. Hickey, Jr., and Vern R. Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 423 (1995).
"' See Paul R. Portney, The Price Is Right: Making Use of Life Cycle Analyses;
Product Life Cycle Analysis, 10(2) IssuES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 69 (1993).
"3 See Candice Stevens, The Environmental Life-Cycle and Trade, OECD OBSERVER, June 8, 1994, at 8.
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to know to make a good decision is price. Full-cost pricing is an
attempt to get the product's price to reflect all the product's costs,
including its environmental impacts. What the ecolabeling debate
should be about is what additional information (beyond price) the
consumer needs and can use.34 Additionally, what form should that
information take, in order to keep from manipulating or misleading
that consumer?
III.

SHARED MANAGEMENT, RISK COMMUNICATION, AND

LEGAL

LIABILITY

Whether dealing with wastes or products, all roads eventually
lead to risk communication within shared management structures.
One thing is very clear: effective communication of appropriate
information about risk, uncertainty, costs and benefits is critical to
meeting society's expectations and minimizing environmental liability. Moreover, such effective communication is expected to occur
between those conducting environmental assessment and all participants in the shared management structure. These participants include
the internal management of the company, suppliers, other affected
businesses, product consumers, regulators, legislators, judges, environmental groups, the press, and the general public. The general
model views all of these parties as sharing in the management
decision making. They all need and expect adequate information to
make their decisions.
All consideration of risk communication today should proceed
in full awareness of the growing scientific literature in this area. The
literature is produced by social and other scientists who study the
causal factors that influence the effectiveness of communication
about risk.35 Some of these factors involve psychological characteristics of people - such as the need to simplify information or the
tendency to maintain already formed beliefs in the face of contrary
evidence. 6 Other factors vary with the objective situation presented, such as the distribution of risks and benefits from a proposed

"' See Portney, supra note 32 (suggesting that LCA be used selectively to supplement, not supplant, price signals).
" E.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION (1989)
(hereinafter RISK COMMUNICATION); Paul Slovic, Informing and Educating the Public
About Risk, 6 RISK ANALYSIS 403 (1986); Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and
Democracy, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 675 (1993).
36 See Baruch Fischhoff, Risk: A Guide to Controversy, reprinted as Appendix C in
RISK COMMUNICATION, supra note 35, at 299-304.
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course of action or the gravity of a possible harm. Yet other factors
are more institutional in nature, such as imbalances in access to
information or decision making processes.37 Effective risk communication within a shared management structure requires careful analysis of the different combinations of factors at play with the various
participants.
Communication must be distinguished from information. Too
often environmental assessors concentrate only on generating information and perhaps disseminating it. Communication, however, puts
the emphasis on the recipient audience. The goal is to adapt the
information to the conceptual framework of each participant in the
shared management structure, thus meeting each of their different
needs for useful information. Risk should be characterized in a way
useful to the various decision makers, and communicated to them in
appropriate formulations.
Failure to communicate adequately about risk is one of the
oldest justifications for imposing environmental liability. In products
liability, it is referred to as "failure to warn"; in occupational health,
the expression is "hazard communication"; with respect to community notification, there is the "right to know"; in other areas, it is
simply "informed consent." Whatever the name of the obligation,
the underlying legal reality is the same. The liability rules prescribe
the minimum information that a decision maker is entitled by law to
receive.
A sound approach to shared management may urge providing
more than the legal minimum. In a recent U.S. case, a train collided
with a negligently driven truck that was carrying herbicide. In the
collision, the train and crew were engulfed in a cloud of the
chemical powder. The railroad and the injured train crew sued the
owner and operator of the truck for damages. After the collision, the
manufacturer of the chemical cargo offered to provide the railroad
with the scientific data needed to analyze samples for the chemical
content on the condition that the railroad would release the
manufacturer from any liability stemming from the collision.38 The
railroad refused to do so. From an adversarial legal perspective, the
manufacturer perhaps acted in a calculated and narrowly rational
manner. But from the shared management perspective, it should not

See RISK COMMUNICATION, supra note 35, at 108-116.
See Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Builders Transport, Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8644 (Order and Reasons), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16464 (E.D. La. 1993)
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law), affd, 48 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 1995).
"

"
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be surprising that society expected much more from that manufacturer than using such information to try to negotiate a release from
liability. If the railroad had not been able to perform the decontamination task without the help of the manufacturer, then the manufacturer ran a risk of having liability imposed upon it. When one
potential party to a shared management structure refuses to share
necessary information with the other decision makers, society should
not expect the remaining participants in that structure to stand by
idly. Liability in part defines the outer boundaries of shared
management structures.
Although the need for information helps explain a good deal of
the trend to extend liability, other pervasive forces are also at work.
As environmental assessors working for industry or government
know from their personal experience, management's expectations
change over time. The information that management expects assessors to develop today, and communicate to them tomorrow, is the
information that managers will need the day after - even if management cannot identify today what information they will need! In
fact, management often does not know what information will be
needed. This is due in part to the nature of decision making about
reasonable risk. Information changes about the nature and extent of
the risk, costs aid benefits change, economic and other social conditions change, and attitudes change about which risks and costs are
acceptable. It should not be surprising that the shared management
decisions of society will, over time, reflect changes in societal expectations.
Many industrialized countries have experienced the direction of
change to be toward less tolerance of increased risk. This is to be
expected. The amount of information about toxicity and exposure
continuously increases, while increased wealth and improved welfare increase risk aversion. Many other factors, such as economic
conditions and education about the environment, undoubtedly play a
role in producing an uneven but generally upward trend of risk
intolerance. When this is coupled with a trend toward more participation by the general public in the decision making processes of
government, the result is an expansion of the sharing of management with the public. The area of legal liability offers many examples of increased shared management through law. A few examples
will serve to illustrate the point.
First, there is the area lawyers call standing. To have standing
is to have a sufficiently peculiar stake in a controversy so as to be
allowed to participate in a legal proceeding before a court or agen-
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cy. The question is who is entitled to bring or participate in an
action to enforce the law. In terms of the general model, it is the
question of who is entitled to participate in shared management
through the courts or agencies. The environmental movement in the
United States gained considerable power as the rules which govern
standing permitted more parties to enforce the laws. Restrictions on
standing are regarded as a significant threat to that movement.39
Second, there are constantly evolving causes of action. A cause
is the legal claim itself that is enforceable in the courts. It
action
of
embodies the substantive laws to be enforced, as well as what must
be proved in court in order to enforce them. From the perspective of
the general model, they are the judicially enforceable management
decision rules adopted by society. Today there is a bewildering
array of such judicially enforceable rules, and their number only
increases over time. Legislatures enact new statutes conferring enforcement initiative on the executive branch or on the public, and in
common law jurisdictions, the courts themselves can institute new
or expanded causes of action. Retrenchment of a cause of action is
the exception.
A third major area of change is access to information. In the
United States there are very liberal rules allowing discovery of
private documents in litigation.' Moreover, there are strong regulations requiring reporting of company data from environmental assessment and monitoring. Such rules open more communication
channels regarding reasonable risk within the shared management
structure. The trend is to make more information public. The shared
management model suggests that this trend is reasonable and will
continue. It is reasonable because, given the increased sharing of
management, the participating decision makers can sensibly insist
that they must have access to all information needed to make their
respective decisions. Although production trade secrets need to be
protected, there is obvious pressure to share all risk and benefit
information.

3 Cf. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871
(1990).
, For. recent debate concerning environmental assessments, compare Koppers Co.,
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 847 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Pa. 1994), mandamus
granted, 40 F.3d 1240 (3d Cir. 1994) (ruling that "self-evaluation privilege" against
discovery does not apply to "environmental reports, records, and memoranda"); Reichhold
Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Fla. 1994) (finding qualified
privilege of "self-critical analysis" for certain retrospective environmental assessments).
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A fourth example is an increase in the types of injury for
which society will order compensatory damages. As mentioned
earlier, a number of jurisdictions in the United States now allow
damages for medical monitoring for signs of cancer.4 Moreover, a
plaintiff exposed to a carcinogen is sometimes allowed to recover
for the fear of developing cancer.42 So far, however, many jurisdictions have been reluctant to allow compensation for the increase in
the risk of cancer in cases where it is not reasonably probable that
cancer will occur.43 But this is a very delicate balance. The courts
clearly are wrestling with the question of the appropriate compensation for being in fact subjected to an unreasonable risk. What is at
issue is the redistribution of a portion of the benefits to be derived
from risk-taking, even in the absence of actual physical injury.
When this issue is viewed as a shared management problem, an
increasing amount of such innovative compensation by the courts
can be expected, and perhaps even by legislatures.
CONCLUSION

This Article has presented a general model with which to
understand legal liability associated with environmental assessment
and monitoring. The suggestion is to think about such assessment as
occurring within the context of a shared management structure that
is trying to make decisions about reasonable risk. Ultimately, what
society expects from environmental assessors is help in making
good decisions about managing risk. This means that it expects
private parties with information, or the capacity to generate information, to participate effectively in the shared management structures making those decisions. Moreover, society expects those parties to communicate that information effectively to all those within
the shared management structure with a need to know the information, and expects them to explain the significance of that information for good risk management. What is reflected in environmental liability is governmental enforcement of the minimum requirements engendered by those expectations.
Due to many historical factors, environmental law today is

"

text.

See note 14 and accompanying text. See also supra, note 28 and accompanying

" E.g., Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 561 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1989); Sorenson v.

Raymark Indus., Inc., 756 P.2d 740 (Wash. App. 1988).
41 See Mauro, 561 A.2d 257.
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often a piecemeal and inefficient means of effectuating such shared
management. The resort to liability as a means of creating shared
management structures is likely to be symptomatic of the fact that
non-legal structures have proved to be less than effective. Society
should not be surprised if such liability-oriented structures also
prove to be relatively ineffective, and inefficient as well. But
societies often welcome help in designing shared management structures that are more effective and efficient. Societies need the help of
those gathering assessment and monitoring data to define the vision
of what can reasonably be achieved, both technologically and
economically. Such suggestions are more likely to be trusted if they
come from parties who appreciate the management problems faced
by the society, and who are willing to work toward fair, effective
and stable solutions to those problems and not just toward private
short-term goals. The shared management model, therefore, suggests
that the environmental arena, when properly understood, is pregnant
with opportunities for simultaneously improving environmental
health, economic wealth, and social strength.

